U.S. v. Holbrook: "Thus, the Heller opinion itself does not 'cast doubt' on the limitation on firearm possession set forth in Section 922(g)(9), and Holbrook makes no other argument that her convictions are violative of the Second Amendment."

U.S. v. Montalvo: "Defendant has not cited any post-Heller decisions declaring 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8) to be unconstitutional, and does not attempt to distinguish the post- Heller cases cited by the government. This is not surprising, since 'it appears that every court which has considered a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. Section 922, post-Heller, has upheld the statute as constitutional.'"

People v. Marsh: "We conclude that (a similar section of California law) falls within this category of prohibitions which are permitted despite the right to bear arms afforded by the Second Amendment. Post-Heller decisions addressing the constitutionality of various firearm possession restrictions have taken a similar approach..."

U.S. v. Luedtke: "Nothing in Heller suggests that the court intended to permit only those precise regulations accepted at the founding. Rather, the court's examples are best understood as representing the types of regulations that pass constitutional muster... Sections 922(g)(8) and (9) are regulations of a type traditionally permitted in this nation..."

U.S. v. Li: "I am satisfied that the provisions of section 922(g)(9) pass constitutional muster, even in the wake of Heller. Li has not offered any persuasive reason to believe that post-Heller constitutional jurisprudence should render it otherwise."

U.S. v. Chester: "The court finds that the prohibition by Congress as embodied in Section 922(g)(9) of the possession of a firearm by a misdemeanant who has committed a crime of domestic violence is a lawful exercise by the government of its regulatory authority notwithstanding the Second Amendment."

U.S. v. Engstrum: "While it is troubling to the court that Section 922(g)(9) may be used to deprive otherwise law-abiding citizens, who pose no prospective risk of violence, of their Second Amendment rights as a result of a single past transgression, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that defendant poses no prospective risk of violence, and that he is constitutionally entitled to an exception to Section 922(g)(9)."

U.S. v. Robinson: "To my knowledge, no court has, even under an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment, found 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g) constitutionally suspect."

U.S. v. White: "On its face, then, Heller did not disturb or implicate the constitutionality of Section 922(g), and was not intended to open the door to a raft of Second Amendment challenges to Section 922(g) convictions. White's Motion to Dismiss would place far more weight on the Heller decision than its plain text can reasonably bear."

In re: United States of America (U.S. v. Engstrum): "Nothing suggests that the Heller dictum, which we must follow, is not inclusive of Section 922(g)(9) involving those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence."