the Great FBI Shootout

Miami: 11 April 1986...
The Ultimate After Action Report!
An unvarnished and illustrated forensic examination
of the FBI's devastating firefight in South Florida
[An abridged version of this report appeared in the August 1999 Handguns and the 1999 Guns & Ammo's Firearms for Law Enforcement.]Outside of the 1963 Kennedy assassination, no 20th Century homicide by gunfire has been more extensively examined and caused more speculation than what has come to be known as the FBI Miami Firefight of 11 April 1986. Indeed, one would have to travel back to October 1881 and the O.K. Corral to find a shootout which has so assumed the mantle of the Epic.

"The repercussions of 11 April 1986 were massive and as far-reaching as any other event in the annals of Law Enforcement..."That event has spawned articles in both gunzines and the popular press, paperbacks, numerous lectures and presentations on the law enforcement circuit, a well-mounted video re-enactment by the Federal Bureau of Investigation aptly entitled "Firefight," a totally dismissable and error-laden segment of the Pernell Roberts-hosted half-hour TV series, "FBI: The Untold Stories," and one shoddy, fanciful two-hour teleflick in NBC's dreadfully revisionist "In the Line of Duty" series, "The F.B.I. Murders", with David Soul and Michael Gross1 as the too-bad-to-be-believed killers, Michael Lee Platt and William Russell Matix, but who were, in reality, "Freddy Kruger" and "Michael Meyers" incarnate, and as despicable a pair of murderers as were ever imagined by producers of the Nightmare on Elm Street and Halloween series of dead teenager splatter flicks.

The repercussions of 11 April 1986 are still being felt, as firearms author Charlie Petty has elsewhere noted2, and that dark event has become the defining moment of the century for handgun ammunition throughout both law enforcement and civilian ranks.

The FBI's C1 (reactive) squad in the Miami field office had been after a pair of savage armored car and bank stick-up artists for six months, and as their criminal acts increased in violence, more FBI man hours were devoted to apprehending them before they robbed and killed again.

In studying the felonious activities of the two well-armed killers, Miami Division Supervisory Special Agent Gordon McNeill and his crime fighters had discerned what they felt was a pattern which might finally give them the ability to close down the vicious duo which had been a two-person crime wave since the October 1985. Acting on their beliefs and information provided by one quick-witted and courageous citizen who'd followed the criminals from the site of a previous robbery and shooting, McNeill put his 14-man rolling stake-out team in ten FBI fleet vehicles3 in the field on that Friday morning and had them working a section of Metro-Dade County along the South Dixie Highway on the alert for a dark-colored 1979 Chevrolet Monte Carlo in which would be riding two white males between the ages of 25 and 40, professional criminals armed with an assortment of weapons which in the past had included shotguns, Colt's/Stoner pattern carbines, long-barreled magnum revolvers and on at least one occasion, a 1911-style .45 ACP pistol.

Sometime after 0900 hours that Friday, Special Agents Ben Grogan and Jerry Dove spotted the suspect vehicle and alerted SSA McNeill that they had surreptitiously slipped behind the black Monte Carlo on the South Dixie Highway. McNeill immediately alerted the rest of his squad that they had their bad guys and gave the coordinates as he, SA Richard Manauzzi in a solo car, SAs Edmundo Mireles and John Hanlon in another vehicle, and SAs Ron Risner and Gil Orrantia in a fifth sedan closed in on the mobile surveillance.

About the time that Manauzzi fell in behind Grogan's and Dove's vehicle with Hanlon and Mireles joining them, Platt and Matix began to get the notion that their game might be up. Using the classic counter-surveillance tactic of making three consecutive right-hand turns in the semi-residential neighborhood of Kendell4, the criminal duo confirmed their suspicions and instead of making a run for it back onto the South Dixie Highway, prepared to live it out with the five FBI agents in low speed pursuit.

At that moment, SSA McNeill arrived on the scene from the opposite direction and passed the "mini-convoy," observing passenger Platt in the lead vehicle loading a high-capacity magazine into a Ruger Mini-14. McNeill would later state that driver Matix's intense demeanor appeared to be that of "a man on a mission."

Still, they were, after all, the FBI, and they already had the bad guys outnumbered six to two, with reinforcements rapidly closing in on the rolling scene. Besides, Grogan and Dove, in the lead pursuit vehicle, were both SWAT-qualified, and Grogan, widely acclaimed as the best shot in the Miami field office, had been, it was later said, preparing his entire law enforcement career for just such a situation as was now developing.

SSA McNeill evaluated the situation and made a judgment call that many have subsequently second-guessed... a felony car stop would be attempted.

It all went horribly wrong from there on in, for when the five vehicles had come to rest one block from the South Dixie Highway behind the Dixie Belle Shopping Center at 12201 SouthWest 82nd Avenue, Ben Grogan's glasses went flying in the impact of the crash, and SAs Manauzzi and Hanlon had lost control and possession of their issue Smith & Wesson revolvers. And as the bad guys both began shooting immediately, never was my colleague Mark Moritz' brilliant aphorism more chillingly brought home: "First Rule of a Gunfight - Have a Gun!"

Manauzzi, who had been driving the vehicle which had finally ridden the Monte Carlo off Southwest 82nd Avenue and into a large tree, his passenger side door just inches from the driver's side of the bad guys' car, was the first of the FBI agents shot, taking a 5.56mm round into his side and body as he dove unarmed out his door and onto the street.

While Platt with the Mini-14 was firing in front of his partner's face at Manauzzi, Matix brought his folding-stocked S&W Model 3000 12 gauge pump shotgun into action, turning and discharging a round of #6 shot at the white Buick to his rear, the vehicle in which Grogan and Dove had been riding.

Grogan, nearly blind without his corrective lenses, had dismounted and begun firing his S&W Model 459, discharging a total of nine rounds of issue 9 X 19mm Winchester 115-grain Silvertip hollow points at the recalcitrant felons inside the Monte Carlo. On the other side of their Buick, Jerry Dove was also shooting his Model 459. He would reload and shoot some more, a total of 20 rounds.

SSA McNeill had taken a position with the left front of his Olds angled into the rear of Manauzzi's vehicle. Managing to throw his (handgun-rated) soft body armor quickly over his suit and tie, he exited his car, leaving his Remington 12 gauge in the back seat. Running over to the front of Manauzzi's car, he immediately went into action with his 2½-inch Model 19, firing across the hood and into the driver's window of the Monte Carlo.

Responding to a 1987 inquiry about his "cognitive thought processes during the event," McNeill stated that he had never felt calmer.

I was the calmest I had ever been when I exited my vehicle. I saw everything clearly in my peripheral vision, I did some shooting, I got shot, I bore down and took two more shots. When I realized that I was out of ammo and that it was still going on... then I got scared!
While McNeill was firing across the hood, SAs Mireles and Hanlon left their vehicle which had crashed into a concrete wall on the far side of the street, and rushed to aid their fellow agents under heavy fire. Hanlon, his primary weapon lost, retrieved his backup five-shot J-frame from an ankle holster and went to support Dove. His Model 870 at port arms, Mireles came up behind McNeill just in time to take a .223 round in his left forearm, the shock of which impact toppled the 6'5" agent into the street where he quickly realized that his ruined left arm was all but useless. Platt's round, however, had not reached his chest when it had been aimed.

After McNeill expended his six rounds of .38 Special 158-grain +P, his right hand grievously wounded, he returned to his Olds sedan to reload as Mireles struggled after him. After only managing to get two fresh rounds into his gore-covered revolver, McNeill arose to reach in the back seat for his shotgun, took a .223 round in his neck, and fell over onto his back, paralyzed and out of the remainder of the firefight. He was intensely aware that he had just looked right into the face of Michael Platt and had the murderous thug smile at him as he squeezed off a fast three rounds at McNeill's head!

Platt had extricated himself from the penned in Monte Carlo and was able to move about as he rained fired upon the agents. What he would almost certainly have been unaware of was that he was already a dead man; from a distance of 30 feet, Jerry Dove had delivered a difficult hit on Platt while he was exiting the passenger window of his car. Mireles would later describe it as "a million dollar shot" on the scrambling Platt who had been presented a narrow target profile exposed for such a brief time.
"Platt shot Hanlon in the groin and turned his attentions to Grogan and Dove, shooting the former multiple times in the body and the younger agent twice in the head."
Sometime during the preceding 45 seconds, Risner (another SWAT-qualified SA with an S&W Model 459) and Orrantia with a four-inch S&W K-frame, had rolled on the scene to take up a covering position across the road where they would fire approximately two dozen rounds between them, scoring two hits on the wily Platt from a distance of 30 yards. Orrantia would be wounded in return.

At that point, with McNeill paralyzed and helpless on his back, Mireles fighting the effects of his avulsed forearm, Grogan unable to clearly locate his target without his glasses, and Manauzzi still unarmed after losing control of his revolver from the impact of the improvised felony stop, the mortally wounded Michael Platt made his daring bid for freedom. Exsanguinating from the FBI hits, he slipped from the cover of the Monte Carlo and moved on the position occupied by Dove and Hanlon. The latter saw him coming and fired all five rounds from his backup S&W Model 36 Chief's Special before ducking down to attempt to reload. Before he could accomplish that, Platt was upon them, and stood over the helpless Hanlon with his folding-stocked Mini-14 aimed at his head. Then, changing his mind, Platt shot the FBI agent in the groin and turned his attentions to Grogan and Dove, shooting the former multiple times in the body and the younger SA twice in the head. Both men died on the spot, while Hanlon lay stricken beneath the rear bumper.

Military-trained, Platt having neutralized the more immediate points of hostile fire, then moved toward his ultimate objective, the open driver's door of the vehicle recently occupied by the two Special Agents he had just murdered. SAs Risner and Orrantia 25 yards across the street were now more concerned about hitting their comrades as Platt stepped falteringly among them.

But Ed Mireles by sheer dint of his formidable will had "regrouped," determined that the killer not escape. As Platt entered the FBI's Buick and his partner appeared out of nowhere to slip into the passenger's seat, Mireles carefully supported his Remington 870 on the right rear bumper of McNeill's Olds, and fired a round of 00 Buck at Platt, hitting him in the feet. As the man slumped into the driver's seat and sought to restart the car, Ed deliberately pulled the 12 gauge shotgun down between his thighs in his sitting position and with only one hand, worked the action and rearmed his weapon. Four times Mireles did this, then painfully rolled out and somehow managed to fire at Platt.

Realizing that someone was posing a threat to his escape, a weakened Platt yanked Matix's six-inch Dan Wesson revolver from his partner's shoulder rig, slowly staggered from his victims' vehicle and attempted to neutralize this last point of fire. There is some contention about which agent Platt was firing at, whether it was the incapacitated McNeill or the partially recovered Mireles, but he fired three .357 Magnum rounds at close range.

Miraculously, he missed.

Platt then lurched back to the Buick and flopped down in the front seat, trying to summon enough strength to get the car started and away from the killing field.

Mireles, however, was determined to assure that this was not an option. With great difficulty, he levitated himself from the ground and, discarding his Remington 12-gauge, walked stiff-legged toward the Buick as he withdrew his own S&W revolver and fired two 158-grain +P lead hollow points at Platt, three at Matix curled in a vain attempt to avoid the deadly fire, and a final one at Platt.

Five of the rounds struck home, Matix was killed on the spot, and Platt, the man who didn't die fast enough, died a little faster although he showed enough vital signs some minutes later that the responding EMTs dragged him from the Buick and inserted an endotracheal tube in his mouth, and an intervascular tube in his left arm.

But the firefight, the bloodiest in the FBI's history, was over.

The repercussions, however, were massive and as far-reaching as any other event in the annals of Law Enforcement....

Originally posted by Logansdad
Miami: 11 April 1986...
Outside of the 1963 Kennedy assassination, no 20th Century homicide by gunfire has been more extensively examined and caused more speculation than what has come to be known as the FBI Miami Firefight of 11 April 1986.

this article was written before the famous North Hollywood Bank of America Shootout :assult:

Assessment of LAPD's Response, by Ron McCarthy, retired long-time member of the LAPD Metropolitan Division S.W.A.T. Team



One of the most compelling deadly force confrontations was played out for the entire world to see when the Los Angeles Police Department responded to a bank robbery of monumental proportions and of great tactical significance. Very few shootouts have provided us with the significant learning points that the North Hollywood Bank Robbery Shootout embodied.


This incident, if reviewed with an eye toward "social" significance and recent law enforcement history in mind, is also an example of long held beliefs and traditional law enforcement concepts that are always under attack, but have been validated as the right way to train the police, because of this shooting.


In order to evaluate this shooting with clarity, it is necessary to separate the significant issues and learning points by category. As the bank robbery was discovered by alert patrol officers, this analysis will begin with the category of initial response. An assessment of weaponry used by the police as well as those used by the suspects will follow. A review of the body armor issues from the armor worn by the police to the armor worn by the suspects will occur. Following the armor review, an inspection of the response and actions of the Los Angeles Police SWAT team will be done. Finally, a discussion of the long term significance of this incident and how it may change law enforcement for the better will follow.


INITIAL OBSERVATION RESPONSE


Uniform patrol officers were on routine patrol when they saw the bank robbers with ski masks over their faces and assault rifles in hand entering the bank. Immediate communication of what the officers had observed resulted in rapid response and excellent containment around the bank by the patrol forces that responded. As the robbers fired their assault rifles inside the bank and physically assaulted the men, women, and children who were employees and customers in the bank, the patrol containment grew. Many minutes went by while the robbers made every effort to steal all the money they could carry. More than three hundred and thirty thousand dollars was taken at gunpoint.


As the robbers exited the bank, they were ordered to "freeze, drop your guns!" The robbers opened up on the patrol officers and the citizens in the community with a barrage of .223 and .308 gunfire both semi-automatic and full automatic. It was obvious to the officers that they were being shot at and wounded by a barrage of heavy weapons fire. This weapons fire was also wounding citizens trapped behind cars, proned out in streets and parking lots, fleeing on foot and in vehicles from the area. It was also obvious that the police were not going away. Although the officers were outgunned and out equipped, the patrol containment was complete, remained steadfast, and would not let the heavily armed suspects leave. There was a heavy price to pay for this bravery and devotion to duty.


The initial observation and rapid deployment was accomplished through professional fundamental training. There is no question that cover and concealment aided officers in reducing the number that were wounded, but the incredible level of violence that was directed at the police and the sheer volume of gunfire that the suspects directed at the officers over a long period of time speaks volumes about their quality and performance of the patrol officers.


As the suspects fled the bank and began their murderous full automatic assault rifle attack on the patrol officers, it was apparent that they were attempting to breach an escape route through the uniformed containment. The fact that a large number of officers were able to respond and deploy was a big component of a brave effort to hold the suspects at the bank.


Large departments have an advantage in the availability of large numbers of officers to respond. The LAPD had approximately 15 patrol officers deployed around all four sides of the bank as the suspects exited. Small agencies must work together to ensure that similar crimes that are predictably going to happen to them have a multi-agency response that replicates a large agency activation. If only four or five officers were on scene at the North Hollywood Bank of America, the suspects would have breached containment the suspects would have been able to concentrate focus and gunfire on more specific targets.


Several years ago, a similar robbery in the community of Norco, California, created a shootout of parallel dimensions. Five suspects with assault rifles and explosives robbed the bank in Norco and fled. They shot eleven police officers, killing one, and shot down a police helicopter during a pursuit that lasted for over an hour. Eventually all suspects were captured or killed, but the cost was high.


BODY ARMOR - BANDITS AND SWAT


We can learn much about body armor from the North Hollywood Shootout. While the suspects had armored themselves to the point they were protected from their feet to their necks, it was obvious they had "overdone" it. They were unable to move swiftly and with tactical flexibility and this hampered their ability to escape. They were unable to "flex" to the degree that they needed to take complete cover positions behind low profile cover. The SWAT officers that responded had a reasonable level of tactical armor protection and had mobility that allowed them to rapidly deploy from their vehicle. They were able to prone out and regain their feet rapidly.


SWAT RESPONSE


The rapid and absolute aggressive tactics of the SWAT officers was paramount in the successful neutralization of the suspect Martasaurano. By resorting to their training and team concept of staying together and communicating, they were a united force. By being able to respond with assault rifles to match the suspect, and by laying down cover fire that was well aimed and very effective in keeping the suspect on the defensive, they were able to deploy at three specific shooting positions. When one of the officers' weapons malfunctioned, this was communicated by voice and that officer was supported by accurate fire until the officer was able to return fire again. The officers preparation and training allowed them to immediately recognize the tactical solution - to prone out and attack the legs of the suspect under the vehicle. The wounds that led to the death of the suspect were all in the legs with the exception of a very serious arm wound.


The single most important component of the SWAT response to this shooting was the ability of the responding SWAT officers to go directly to the scene with all of the necessary weaponry and body armor. The fact that the LAPD SWAT officers carry all of their equipment with them while on duty, as well as taking it home (in their police vehicles) when off duty, allowed for response without a time consuming delay for issuance of weapons and equipment. The LAPD SWAT officers were also able to select appropriate weapons because they have the choice in their car of MP5s, M26s, Shotguns, H&K .223 caliber assault rifles and AR 15s. They learned long ago that certain weapons are needed for specific tactical functions. MP5s are a fine weapon, but are not the best choice for the situation confronting LAPD SWAT on this day. It is essential that SWAT officers have weapons available with them, and that they have the choice of weapons and ammunition to match the tactical problem.

FUTURE WEAPONS CONSIDERATIONS


The patrol officers should have had small caliber rifle capability. Had they been issued this essential piece of equipment, head shots were a possible solution for them. Without a Ruger 9MM or 40 S&W rifle, or an AR 15 or M16, head shots that could have ended the threat were out of the question. The political environment in the City of Los Angeles borders on a third world mentality and it may never be possible to provide this easy to use and accurate weapon.


Safariland's distributor in San Diego, Don Hacklander, regularly demonstrates the safety and ease of the urban rifle by taking a police academy's poorest shooting cadet and in 15 minutes having that cadet shooting 50 yard head shots. This simplicity of training, citizen safety through accuracy, and low cost can only be achieved through an urban rifle such as the Ruger 9MM or 40 S&W. Agencies large and small should consider deployment of this weapon, not as a replacement for the shotgun, because it can't, but as an enhancement of officer capability and accuracy which it can.


FUTURE ARMOR CONSIDERATIONS


Police body armor must be at pace with the types and kinds of threats that can face the field police officer. Safariland has developed a tactical vest for patrol use that can effectively stop assault rifle impacts. This vest is a Tactical Level 3A with the ability to insert Class 3 and Class 4 plates. Its relatively low cost and its ability to blend with the patrol officer's duty belt equipment set up makes it a fine tactical option.


LIABILITY ISSUES


There are few who would criticize LAPD on their performance during this violent confrontation with murderous felons. The suspects, Phillips and Martasaurano were experienced, well trained, committed terrorists. The violent assault they perpetrated upon innocent citizens including children was atrocious. Some allege that the police did not provide medical attention in a timely manner and that caused the death of the suspect, Martasaurano. Nothing could be further from the truth.


When the final suspect surrendered, wounded citizens were scattered throughout the area. Wounded police officers were lying in parking lots and the street. Both the citizens and the police were a priority for two important reasons. First, they come before suspects when there is a "waiting list" for medical attention. Second, the police and EMT personnel did not know if Martasaurano was in possession of explosives or was "booby-trapped." Based upon the suspect's actions and appearance, these concerns were very real. Only when a suspect is rendered safe and can be searched safely can medical aid be risked.

Police training and the foremost experts recommend extreme caution, and response to citizens and officers first, under the circumstances that confronted the LAPD SWAT team. The National Tactical Officers Association's Tactical Emergency Medical Section has trained hundreds of officers to respond just as the LAPD SWAT team did. Medical doctors familiar with this kind of tactical medical emergency would and have endorsed the actions of the LAPD SWAT team.

Finally, as a former member of the LAPD SWAT team, I want to extend my congratulations to the brave patrol officers as well as to SWAT for a job well done.

after the Great FBI Shootout in Miami the FBI cast about for a better handgun round..the 10mm was born..then the .40 S&W :target:

Concluding the analysis of the FBI's 11 April 1986 Florida firefight
That infamous Friday morning in Florida's Dade County also quickly took on historical significance, for it directly led to the FBI's convening of its first Wound Ballistics Seminar over 15-17 September 1987 to see what direction the Bureau should pursue to more effectively arm its Field Special Agents. In the wake of the tragedy in which agents Grogan and Dove were slain, and five others wounded, John Hall, who 28 months later took over as head of the Bureau's Firearms Training Unit, had made the startling pronouncement, "All else aside, Miami was an ammo failure."

The Weapons Advisory Committee of the FBI Academy had been conducting an evaluation of many semi-auto pistols in both .45 ACP and 9 x 19mm in consideration of issuing them to FBI Field SWAT teams and Special Operations Groups (SOG) such as the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). In an attempt to resolve the contentious question of caliber selection and substantiate the final selection recommendation, a decision was made to seek "outside expertise to analyze the factors involved in handgun wounding and the relative effectiveness of the two calibers."

And from that Quantico conference emerged the name of Dr. Martin L. Fackler, Colonel, U.S.A., as a major force in the literature of what has regrettably come to be known as "handgun stopping power." With his battle cry of "Penetration is paramount" and his heavy reliance on ordnance gelatin as a test medium, Dr. Fackler and his growing legion of "jello junkies" set up in opposition to the "morgue monsters" led by former Detroit Homicide Detective Evan Marshall, who for years had been publishing after-action reports in various police and popular gunzines, explaining how sundry individuals had reacted to being shot with different handguns, often illustrating his texts with handgun projectiles recovered during post mortem exams.

Aside from the foundation of the Fackler-led International Wound Ballistics Association, and the 1991 publication of an inordinately successful volume by Marshall and Edwin Sanow, "Handgun Stopping Power," the Miami shootout and subsequent Wound Ballistics Seminar paved the way for Hornady's debut of the first of the "designer" handgun rounds, the XTP-HP, whose most pronounced attribute, not coincidentally, was its formidable penetrative abilities.

Although handgun ammunition design has inexorably evolved over the past dozen years, and those who survived the terrible firefight have gotten on with their lives, the event is still of great interest to many in the firearms and law enforcement community, and some elements of that confrontation have taken on near mythic proportions, not the least of which is the remarkable fortitude of SA Edmundo Mireles, Jr. who overcame severe injuries and brought the felons' careers to an irrevocable close.Frequently in discussions, the author has also expressed a grudging awe of the huge "stones" possessed by VERY bad guy Michael Platt, who, mortally wounded early on, single-handedly carried the firefight with the eight FBI agents. I had put forth the notion that had his partner in murder William Matix held up his end of the battle (Matix fired just that ONE round of Winchester-Western 12 gauge #6 without effect from his S&W Model 3000, compared to Platt's 48 rounds from a Mini-14 and two .357 Magnum revolvers), the two murderous thugs would have escaped from the Southwest 82nd Avenue kill zone in the vehicle of slain SAs Grogan and Dove, although Platt, and probably Matix, would have expired shortly thereafter.

David Rivers, supervisor of the crime scene for Metro-Dade Police Department, went one step farther.

"If Matix had done his part," he related in 1987, the details still vivid in his mind, "more FBI would have died, as well as some uniforms" (responding local police).

Many had always been curious about what Matix had been doing during the furious four minute action, reasoning that perhaps it was planned that Platt lay down a field of fire with his folding-stock blue Mini-14 while Matix broke for another vehicle in which they might escape... except that he wound up in the front passenger seat of the Grogan/Dove fleet car, and it was Platt who got behind the wheel.

Hmmmn! Well, maybe Matix, his ear drums (according to the most popular recounting of the event) ruptured by Platt's 13 rapid-fire .223 shots right in front of his face in the enclosed space of their Monte Carlo, in excruciating pain and possibly partially blinded, was so disoriented that he just couldn't function.

However, thanks to Forensic Analysis of the April 11, 1986, FBI Firefight, a truly remarkable 128-page volume privately published by W. French Anderson, M.D. and professor of Biochemistry and Pediatrics at the University of Southern California's School of Medicine, some startling new information about that infamous firefight has come to light, not the least of which is just why Matix was unable to hold up his end of the deal. The fifth round of .38 Special +P fired by SSA Gordon McNeill from his 2½-inch S&W Model 19 in the furious exchange hit Matix with a penetrating wound of the right lateral face, fracturing the right maxillary sinus and middle cranial fossa, and causing a contusion of the right temporal lobe.

In Anderson's marvelously detailed narrative, the wound...

"...must have been devastating. It fractured the base of the skull and contused the brain. It should have knocked Matix unconscious. ... It is difficult to comprehend how an individual received this wound, laid unconscious for one or more minutes, and then managed to become sufficiently alert to leave (his vehicle), move around for 1-2 minutes, figure out that Platt had entered Grogan/Dove's car, travel to that car, and get in.... Matix's ability to function with that head wound was extraordinary."
And for the record, the Mini-14 blasts right in front of his unprotected face and ears5 seem to have not influenced Matix's actions in the slightest...

"...despite the fact that Platt fired 13 rounds from his .223 directly in front of Matix's face in essentially a closed car, the concussive effect of these muzzle blasts apparently did not damage Matix's eyes or ears. The corneas of Matix's eyes were intact at autopsy, and the absence of blood in Matix's ear canals suggests that his eardrums were also intact."
A perception that many have held the intervening years is that the eight FBI agents' marksmanship was gravely lacking. Not so, argues Dr. Anderson, and presents a persuasive brief that a number of FBI hits were good ones; they just happened to run up against two highly trained (military police, 101st Airborne and Rangers), well-practiced (approximately 750-1,500 rounds per week which they had purchased or robbed from several unfortunate civilians plinking in the Everglades), and extremely focussed individuals in Platt and Matix. The FBI fired a verified 70 rounds (possibly as many as 77 or 78) and delivered 18 wounds to the bad guys, firing at extremely hostile targets obscured by gunsmoke, considerable amounts of dust and debris from the crashing, careening cars, and the deep shadows of the trees beneath which their vehicle came to rest.

Among those wounds, McNeill hit Matix with that head shot plus a neck/chest shot early on in the fight; Dove delivered that difficult hit as Platt was wriggling from the passenger window of the Monte Carlo, as well as two others; Risner (from 30 yards!) also made a lethal chest wound on Platt in mid-fight; and Mireles, after his shotgun blast had delayed Platt with four 00 foot wounds, had one-handedly put three rounds into Matix's head and two into Platt (one central nervous system, one scalp) all while himself gravely wounded.

An adversary gets hit square in the head with a 158-grain +P, and he isn't stopped, you are having a bad day! McNeill, Mireles and Hanlon had bad days... only Grogan and Dove had worse ones. In light of this information, perhaps John Hall's "ammo failure" assessment has some merit... but then as a war veteran chum with more than three dozen confirmed kills continually asserts, "the more I see of this stuff, the more I'm convinced that nothing hand-held is absolutely reliable."

that struck Platt and matix in the head penetrated to their brains. They died from LUCK hits to their necs, richocheted there from the head hits. 45of those hits to the head were from 4" barrels, too, from a range of 3-6 feet from the muzzle. those who "think" that such loads are adequate, from a 2" barrel are living in a fantasy world.

[Rooster]

"The FBI fired a verified 70 rounds (possibly as many as 77 or 78) and delivered 18 wounds to the bad guys, firing at extremely hostile targets obscured by gunsmoke, considerable amounts of dust and debris from the crashing, careening cars, and the deep shadows of the trees"

10mm or 25 auto it helps to hit the bad guys! Ammo or Marksmanship, I think the later had a large part.

Originally posted by Logansdad
[BA perception that many have held the intervening years is that the eight FBI agents' marksmanship was gravely lacking. Not so, argues Dr. Anderson, and presents a persuasive brief that a number of FBI hits were good ones; they just happened to run up against two highly trained (military police, 101st Airborne and Rangers), well-practiced (approximately 750-1,500 rounds per week which they had purchased or robbed from several unfortunate civilians plinking in the Everglades), and extremely focussed individuals in Platt and Matix [/B]

you probably aren't going to run into muggers who fit this description..:target:

coup de grace exectution shots, on unarmed, dying men, from 3-6 ft away. Almost none of the remaining 12 hits were solid hits, and what solid hits they got were pure luck. anything you can't do 50% of the time is luck, like getting tails in a coin toss. The same shooters, range, guns, loads didn't get anything CLOSE to 50% good hits. So it was luck. The only thing that kept platt from killing all EIGHT Feds (not 7) that day, was the LUCK hit that struck his arm and chest. Otherwise, he'd have been about 10x as effective. He and Matix were idiots, no body armor, no disguises, making all that money, not BUYING clunker cars for the robberies, no backup cars stashed along the route, robbing banks in same town, no ear protection, etc. If such cops ever run up against a pair who really know what's what, they'd better have them outnumbered 20 to 1. Matix was so stupid as to have had small birdshot in his 12 gauge.

Originally posted by over
coup de grace exectution shots, on unarmed, dying men, from 3-6 ft away. Almost none of the remaining 12 hits were solid hits, and what solid hits they got were pure luck. anything you can't do 50% of the time is luck, like getting tails in a coin toss. The same shooters, range, guns, loads didn't get anything CLOSE to 50% good hits. So it was luck. The only thing that kept platt from killing all EIGHT Feds (not 7) that day, was the LUCK hit that struck his arm and chest. Otherwise, he'd have been about 10x as effective. He and Matix were idiots, no body armor, no disguises, making all that money, not BUYING clunker cars for the robberies, no backup cars stashed along the route, robbing banks in same town, no ear protection, etc. If such cops ever run up against a pair who really know what's what, they'd better have them outnumbered 20 to 1. Matix was so stupid as to have had small birdshot in his 12 gauge.

too bad you weren't there to show them how it should have been done

US would have been in flames.

[NRAJOE]

Thanks for the info LD...:right: