Assessment of LAPD's Response, by Ron McCarthy, retired long-time member of the LAPD Metropolitan Division S.W.A.T. Team
One of the most compelling deadly force confrontations was played out for the entire world to see when the Los Angeles Police Department responded to a bank robbery of monumental proportions and of great tactical significance. Very few shootouts have provided us with the significant learning points that the North Hollywood Bank Robbery Shootout embodied.
This incident, if reviewed with an eye toward "social" significance and recent law enforcement history in mind, is also an example of long held beliefs and traditional law enforcement concepts that are always under attack, but have been validated as the right way to train the police, because of this shooting.
In order to evaluate this shooting with clarity, it is necessary to separate the significant issues and learning points by category. As the bank robbery was discovered by alert patrol officers, this analysis will begin with the category of initial response. An assessment of weaponry used by the police as well as those used by the suspects will follow. A review of the body armor issues from the armor worn by the police to the armor worn by the suspects will occur. Following the armor review, an inspection of the response and actions of the Los Angeles Police SWAT team will be done. Finally, a discussion of the long term significance of this incident and how it may change law enforcement for the better will follow.
INITIAL OBSERVATION RESPONSE
Uniform patrol officers were on routine patrol when they saw the bank robbers with ski masks over their faces and assault rifles in hand entering the bank. Immediate communication of what the officers had observed resulted in rapid response and excellent containment around the bank by the patrol forces that responded. As the robbers fired their assault rifles inside the bank and physically assaulted the men, women, and children who were employees and customers in the bank, the patrol containment grew. Many minutes went by while the robbers made every effort to steal all the money they could carry. More than three hundred and thirty thousand dollars was taken at gunpoint.
As the robbers exited the bank, they were ordered to "freeze, drop your guns!" The robbers opened up on the patrol officers and the citizens in the community with a barrage of .223 and .308 gunfire both semi-automatic and full automatic. It was obvious to the officers that they were being shot at and wounded by a barrage of heavy weapons fire. This weapons fire was also wounding citizens trapped behind cars, proned out in streets and parking lots, fleeing on foot and in vehicles from the area. It was also obvious that the police were not going away. Although the officers were outgunned and out equipped, the patrol containment was complete, remained steadfast, and would not let the heavily armed suspects leave. There was a heavy price to pay for this bravery and devotion to duty.
The initial observation and rapid deployment was accomplished through professional fundamental training. There is no question that cover and concealment aided officers in reducing the number that were wounded, but the incredible level of violence that was directed at the police and the sheer volume of gunfire that the suspects directed at the officers over a long period of time speaks volumes about their quality and performance of the patrol officers.
As the suspects fled the bank and began their murderous full automatic assault rifle attack on the patrol officers, it was apparent that they were attempting to breach an escape route through the uniformed containment. The fact that a large number of officers were able to respond and deploy was a big component of a brave effort to hold the suspects at the bank.
Large departments have an advantage in the availability of large numbers of officers to respond. The LAPD had approximately 15 patrol officers deployed around all four sides of the bank as the suspects exited. Small agencies must work together to ensure that similar crimes that are predictably going to happen to them have a multi-agency response that replicates a large agency activation. If only four or five officers were on scene at the North Hollywood Bank of America, the suspects would have breached containment the suspects would have been able to concentrate focus and gunfire on more specific targets.
Several years ago, a similar robbery in the community of Norco, California, created a shootout of parallel dimensions. Five suspects with assault rifles and explosives robbed the bank in Norco and fled. They shot eleven police officers, killing one, and shot down a police helicopter during a pursuit that lasted for over an hour. Eventually all suspects were captured or killed, but the cost was high.
BODY ARMOR - BANDITS AND SWAT
We can learn much about body armor from the North Hollywood Shootout. While the suspects had armored themselves to the point they were protected from their feet to their necks, it was obvious they had "overdone" it. They were unable to move swiftly and with tactical flexibility and this hampered their ability to escape. They were unable to "flex" to the degree that they needed to take complete cover positions behind low profile cover. The SWAT officers that responded had a reasonable level of tactical armor protection and had mobility that allowed them to rapidly deploy from their vehicle. They were able to prone out and regain their feet rapidly.
SWAT RESPONSE
The rapid and absolute aggressive tactics of the SWAT officers was paramount in the successful neutralization of the suspect Martasaurano. By resorting to their training and team concept of staying together and communicating, they were a united force. By being able to respond with assault rifles to match the suspect, and by laying down cover fire that was well aimed and very effective in keeping the suspect on the defensive, they were able to deploy at three specific shooting positions. When one of the officers' weapons malfunctioned, this was communicated by voice and that officer was supported by accurate fire until the officer was able to return fire again. The officers preparation and training allowed them to immediately recognize the tactical solution - to prone out and attack the legs of the suspect under the vehicle. The wounds that led to the death of the suspect were all in the legs with the exception of a very serious arm wound.
The single most important component of the SWAT response to this shooting was the ability of the responding SWAT officers to go directly to the scene with all of the necessary weaponry and body armor. The fact that the LAPD SWAT officers carry all of their equipment with them while on duty, as well as taking it home (in their police vehicles) when off duty, allowed for response without a time consuming delay for issuance of weapons and equipment. The LAPD SWAT officers were also able to select appropriate weapons because they have the choice in their car of MP5s, M26s, Shotguns, H&K .223 caliber assault rifles and AR 15s. They learned long ago that certain weapons are needed for specific tactical functions. MP5s are a fine weapon, but are not the best choice for the situation confronting LAPD SWAT on this day. It is essential that SWAT officers have weapons available with them, and that they have the choice of weapons and ammunition to match the tactical problem.
The patrol officers should have had small caliber rifle capability. Had they been issued this essential piece of equipment, head shots were a possible solution for them. Without a Ruger 9MM or 40 S&W rifle, or an AR 15 or M16, head shots that could have ended the threat were out of the question. The political environment in the City of Los Angeles borders on a third world mentality and it may never be possible to provide this easy to use and accurate weapon.
Safariland's distributor in San Diego, Don Hacklander, regularly demonstrates the safety and ease of the urban rifle by taking a police academy's poorest shooting cadet and in 15 minutes having that cadet shooting 50 yard head shots. This simplicity of training, citizen safety through accuracy, and low cost can only be achieved through an urban rifle such as the Ruger 9MM or 40 S&W. Agencies large and small should consider deployment of this weapon, not as a replacement for the shotgun, because it can't, but as an enhancement of officer capability and accuracy which it can.
FUTURE ARMOR CONSIDERATIONS
Police body armor must be at pace with the types and kinds of threats that can face the field police officer. Safariland has developed a tactical vest for patrol use that can effectively stop assault rifle impacts. This vest is a Tactical Level 3A with the ability to insert Class 3 and Class 4 plates. Its relatively low cost and its ability to blend with the patrol officer's duty belt equipment set up makes it a fine tactical option.
LIABILITY ISSUES
There are few who would criticize LAPD on their performance during this violent confrontation with murderous felons. The suspects, Phillips and Martasaurano were experienced, well trained, committed terrorists. The violent assault they perpetrated upon innocent citizens including children was atrocious. Some allege that the police did not provide medical attention in a timely manner and that caused the death of the suspect, Martasaurano. Nothing could be further from the truth.
When the final suspect surrendered, wounded citizens were scattered throughout the area. Wounded police officers were lying in parking lots and the street. Both the citizens and the police were a priority for two important reasons. First, they come before suspects when there is a "waiting list" for medical attention. Second, the police and EMT personnel did not know if Martasaurano was in possession of explosives or was "booby-trapped." Based upon the suspect's actions and appearance, these concerns were very real. Only when a suspect is rendered safe and can be searched safely can medical aid be risked.
Police training and the foremost experts recommend extreme caution, and response to citizens and officers first, under the circumstances that confronted the LAPD SWAT team. The National Tactical Officers Association's Tactical Emergency Medical Section has trained hundreds of officers to respond just as the LAPD SWAT team did. Medical doctors familiar with this kind of tactical medical emergency would and have endorsed the actions of the LAPD SWAT team.
Finally, as a former member of the LAPD SWAT team, I want to extend my congratulations to the brave patrol officers as well as to SWAT for a job well done.
I'm a proponent of rifle training and having a rifle in every cop car. As noted here, a Ruger carbine or an AR-15 would be a good choice. I have my own concept for an excellent police carbine, which I've discussed earlier, but models and calibers out there are certainly good choices.
While some departments can't justify the cost, I don't see the sense of it, since amidst the costs of police cars and salaries, $700 for a rifle that will last years under repeated use really isn't that bad.
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Trust is earned, not... GIVEN away. - Worf
First of all, from what I've read the officers involve acted in what is without a doubt one of the most extraordinarily brave and skilled police actions in US history. Hats off to them.
But here are a couple of ideas off the top of my head that might give police a better advantage in a similar situation:
Have at least one officer in every force of considerable size, preferrably at least one for every shift, trained and equipped to use a scoped .308 semi-auto for sniping lightly armored personell and a .50 caliber rifle for those really hard to get stains, and a way to get him to the scene as quickly as possible.
A .223 in every cop car. Or at least every other cop car.
A shotgun loaded with slugs. It might not pierce the armor, but a 12 gauge slug to the chest would put superman on the ground.
The best possible body armor for the officers. The Safariland armor mentioned in the article sounds pretty good, the ability to insert plates for more protection is especially apealling.
That's my 2 cents on the subject.
As for the criticism that they should have treated the perps' wounds faster, screw the perps. There were civilians and cops who needed help immediately, the perps should be at the back of the line.
On May 9th, 1980, Riverside County, California Sheriff's Department received a report of a 211 in progress at the Security Pacific Bank on 4th and Hamner, in Norco, California. Deputy Glyn Bolasky was the first officer on scene. Deputy Bolasky was shot in the shoulder as five highly armed suspects exited the bank and attempted to get into their getaway vehicle, a green van. The gunman were armed with automatic rifles, handguns, and improvised explosive devices (IED's).
Deputy Bolasky, hurt and bleeding, shot and killed the driver of the van with his shotgun. The remaining four suspects exited the van and again shot at Deputy Bolasky, before stealing a pickup truck from the bank's parking lot. Deputy Bolasky still managed to survive after being shot four times.
The suspects took off towards the foothills, leaving behind the $20,000 they had attempted to steal. For the price of $4,000 each, these criminals entered a bank, put the public in jeopardy and shot a sheriff's deputy. During the pursuit, the suspects fired their weapons and used the IED's they had made to disable several of the pursuing officer's cruisers. San Bernardino Sheriffs, California Highway Patrol, Fontana and Ontario Police assisted in the pursuit.
While traveling North on I-15, the gunman struck a San Bernardino helicopter with gunfire, forcing it to land and discontinue pursuit. Deputy James B. Evans, 39 years old, became the lead unit. The chase led onto Sierra Avenue towards Lytle Creek. Deputy Evans radioed to dispatch that he felt the gunman would wait around one of the curves for the units to appear. Deputy Evans requested for the helicopter to watch out for something like that.
A second San Bernardino Sheriff's helicopter tried to warn Evans that the gunman had set up an ambush, just as he had warned. The helicopter tried to raise Deputy Evans on the radio, but he did not have CLEMAR (California Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Radio) and could not hear the helicopter. As Deputy Evans rounded the curve, he was met with a barrage of gunfire. Deputy Evans was killed instantly when he was struck in the eye with a bullet.
Deputy McCarthy was following Deputy Evans. Deputy McCarthy shot back at the suspects with an assault rifle that he picked up from the station. The suspects fled into the woods and got away.
Three men surrendered on the morning of May 11th, and the L.A. Sheriff's Office SWAT Team shot the last suspect at large. Deputy Evans' family included his wife and their young child.
The following sound file contains some of the actual radio transmissions made that day by the heroic officers involved. (3:41 minutes)
download
There is surprisingly little information on this topic on the Internet. I searched through several resources to find the information that I included above. I have listed the resources on the bottom of this page to give credit to their part in this writing, and to give you the opportunity to learn more about this event.
i have read this thread a number of times as well as read it before i came across it here in the G&G forum. it just amazes me every time, the way the officers in both situations acted. pure heroism. can anyone imagine what was going through the officers minds? i cant. these guys are putting themselves in between the citizens and those animals cause it is what they do. hats off to these fine officers and hats off to any officer out there, anywhere, who is doing the job they do. too often they dont know how appreciated they are, and they should be reminded of that now and again.
North Hollywood Bank of America shootout 
a different bank robbery shootout 
